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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to test for the influence of neighborhood deprivation on
individual unemployment probability in the case of Lyon (France). We estimate a
bivariate probit model of unemployment and location in a deprived neighborhood.
Our identification strategy is twofold. First, we instrument neighborhood type by
the gender composition of household’s children and the spouse’s workplace. Sec-
ond, we use the methodology proposed by Altonji et al. (2005), that in our case
consists in making hypotheses as to the correlation between the unobservables that
determine unemployment and the unobservables that influence the selection into
neighborhood types. Our results show that the effect of neighborhood deprivation
is not significantly different from zero in the bivariate probit with exclusion restric-
tions. We also show that a correlation of the unobservables as low as ten percent
of the correlation of observables is sufficient to explain the positive neighborhood
effect that is observed when endogeneity is not accounted for.
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A rapidly growing stream of research in the social interactions literature focuses on neigh-
borhood effects, that is, the impact of neighbors’ characteristics and behaviors on indi-
vidual socio-economic outcomes (Durlauf, 2004). In particular, theoretical and empirical
evidence suggests that interactions with neighbors are likely to affect individual labor-
market outcomes through peer effects and role models in the human capital acquisition
process, attitudes toward work, and dissemination of information on job opportunities.
Arnott and Rowse (1987) show that less-able learners exert negative externalities on the
learning process of other students. Be´nabou (1993) argues that the cost of education ac-
quisition may be influenced by education decisions of neighbors. Wilson (1987) explains
that the lack of successful role models among older adults in deprived neighborhoods may
influence youths’ motivations and attitudes toward work. The role of social networks
on information about job openings has also been highlighted, especially for low-skilled
workers who often resort to informal search modes such as personal contacts (see Selod
and Zenou, 2006 and Zenou, 2008 for theoretical models). As a consequence, the percent-
age of employed individuals in the neighborhood may influence other residents’ access to
job opportunities (Topa, 2001; Bayer et al., 2005). Finally, the stigmatization of deprived
neighborhoods may lead employers to discriminate workers on the basis of their residential
location (Zenou and Boccard, 2000).
Measuring neighborhood effects raises the issue of location choice endogeneity, which
generates correlated effects (Moffitt, 2001; Durlauf, 2004). Indeed, urban economics has
recognized for long that individuals with similar socio-economic characteristics, labor-
market outcomes, and unobservable traits tend to sort themselves into certain areas of the
urban space. Therefore, studies that do not control for the endogeneity of social group will
yield biased results (Krauth, 2006). The inadequate correction for this bias has been put
forward to explain the great divergence of results obtained by empirical studies (Ginther
et al., 2000) and is one of the major focuses of recent research on neighborhood effects.
This paper aims to test for the existence of neighborhood effects on unemployment
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focusing on the endogeneity issue (i) by accounting for the sorting into neighborhoods
based on observed and unobserved characteristics and (ii) by using two different and
complementary identification strategies thus providing a robustness test of the results.
The application is on French data. Indeed, theories highlighting the impact of neighbor-
hood composition on individual labor-market outcomes have emerged in the context of
U.S. metropolitan areas and empirical studies are numerous in this context. In contrast,
empirical evidence on this matter in Europe is recent and still scarce. Exceptions include
Fieldhouse (1999) and Bolster et al. (2007) on Britain, Dujardin et al. (2008) on Belgium,
Andersson (2004) and Galster et al. (2008) on Sweden.1 In France, neighborhood effects
have been studied (alongside with spatial mismatch effects) for Paris (Gobillon and Selod,
2007; Gobillon et al., 2009) and Bordeaux (Gaschet and Gaussier, 2004). However, these
French studies do not perfectly deal with the endogeneity of neighborhood choice, which
is the main focus of the present paper.
In the following, we estimate the impact of neighborhood deprivation on individ-
ual unemployment probabilities in Lyon, the 2nd largest French city. In order to take
into account threshold effects, as suggested by Crane (1991), in the relationship between
neighborhood deprivation and individual outcomes, we classify neighborhoods as deprived
or not on the basis of a data analysis step. Then a simultaneous model of unemployment
and neighborhood type is estimated. Two different identification strategies are used. In a
first strategy, identification relies classically on exclusion restrictions. We use the gender
composition of household’s children as well as the spouse’s workplace as instruments for
neighborhood type. This set of instruments is carefully discussed and their relevance and
validity are thoroughly tested. Second, following Altonji et al. (2005), we estimate this
simultaneous probit model with no exclusions but imposing constraints on the correlation
of error terms that amount to making hypotheses as to the intensity of selection into de-
prived neighborhoods based on unobservables. These assumptions allow to place bounds
to the neighborhood effects on unemployment. To our knowledge, this application of the
Altonji et al. method to the estimation of neighborhood effects is novel, one exception in
1We restrict here ourselves on studies of neighborhood effects on labor-market outcomes exclusively.
Note however that other types of outcomes have been studied in the European context, including France.
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a similar spirit being Krauth (2009).
Our results show that living in the 25% most deprived neighborhoods of Lyon signif-
icantly increases unemployment probabilities in a naive probit model that do not control
for the endogeneity of location. However, the effect of neighborhood deprivation is not
significant anymore once endogeneity is properly dealt with in a simultaneous probit spec-
ification with exclusion restrictions. Moreover, the second identification strategy, based
on the correlation of error terms, suggests that only a small amount of correlation between
the unobservables is sufficient to explain the positive neighborhood effect that is observed
when endogeneity is not accounted for.
The paper proceeds with Section 2 which defines the endogeneity issue and presents
the various identification strategies used in the literature. Section 3 describes the database
and gives a brief description of the spatial structure of Lyon. Section 4 presents our econo-
metric model and identification strategies. Results are presented in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Identification of neighborhood effects
In a widely cited article, Manski (1993) identifies three types of mechanisms which ex-
plain the fact that individuals belonging to the same group tend to behave similarly: (i)
endogenous effects wherein an individual’s behavior is influenced by the average behavior
in the group, (ii) contextual effects wherein an individual’s behavior is influenced by the
average characteristics in the group, and (iii) correlated effects, wherein similar behaviors
in a group are the result of exposure to common unobserved factors or of non random
group selection.
The goal of contemporaneous work on social interaction effects is to disentangle
these different kinds of mechanisms. Indeed, social interaction effects, of which neigh-
borhood effects are a special case defined on a geographical basis, consist in endogenous
and contextual effects, each of which having different policy implications (Moffitt, 2001;
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Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2001). Correlated effects, if not corrected for, bias the estimates
of endogenous and contextual effects (Dietz, 2002; Durlauf, 2004). Indeed, correlated ef-
fects arise because individuals (or households) are not distributed at random across social
groups (or neighborhoods). On the contrary, individuals self-select into neighborhoods on
the basis of their individual characteristics, which are also likely to influence the outcome
or behavior of interest. Some of these characteristics are observed and can be controlled for
in a simple regression analysis. But others are unobserved to the researcher (for example,
motivations or abilities). This generates a nonzero correlation between the unobserved
determinants of the outcome and unobserved determinants of neighborhood belonging,
which is likely to yield biased neighborhood effect estimates. Recent studies have high-
lighted the reduction of estimated social interaction effects that stems from correcting for
such biases (Ginther et al., 2000; Krauth, 2006).
In this context, the objective of this article is to estimate neighborhood effects on
unemployment, i.e. contextual effects and endogenous effects together, while purging the
bias due to correlated effects. In doing so, we consider the correction for self-selection into
neighborhoods as a precondition to the estimation of neighborhood effects and we leave
the distinction between endogenous and contextual effects for future research.
Various strategies have been proposed in the empirical literature to correct for non
random group selection in neighborhood effect studies. Quasi-experimental situations,
in which households are moved from one neighborhood to another through an exogenous
governmental intervention are considered as providing quite reliable estimates of neighbor-
hood effects. The best-known examples of such interventions are the Gautreaux Program
and the Moving To Opportunity Program (see Oreopoulos, 2003, for a review). While such
studies have been able to show the existence of neighborhood effects on teenagers behav-
iors and outcomes, it seems that neighborhood effects on adult labor-market outcomes
are of much lower importance, if any (Kling et al., 2007; Katz et al., 2001). Another
strand of literature uses longitudinal data and estimates neighborhood effects through
fixed-effect models, thus allowing to control for individual unobserved characteristics that
are constant across time (Weinberg et al., 2004; Galster et al., 2008). For example, Wein-
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berg et al. (2004) find that hours worked are influenced by neighborhood characteristics
but comparison of results with and without fixed-effects suggests that naive estimates are
strongly overestimated. A final approach consists in instrumental variables techniques,
i.e. replacing the neighborhood characteristic by a set of variables that are correlated
with the latter but not with the unobserved determinants of the outcome. Unfortunately,
finding a good instrument is a difficult task. Most studies up to now have used instru-
ments defined on an aggregate basis, in general city-level variables. For example, Foster
and McLanahan (1996) use city-level labor-market conditions as instruments for neigh-
borhood dropout rate in their study of educational outcomes. Evans et al. (1992) use a
similar strategy. Cutler and Glaeser (1997) study the influence of city-level segregation
level on education and income for blacks, using public finance and topographic charac-
teristics as instruments. However, such instruments have been criticized as it is not clear
how they can account for neighborhood effects within cities (Durlauf, 2004) and it is likely
that aggregate-level instruments may actually increase biases (Rivkin, 2001). Instruments
defined at the individual level have been used in other research contexts. For example,
Currie and Yelowitz (2000) and Goux and Maurin (2005) estimate the effect of public
housing occupancy and overcrowded housing respectively on educational outcome using
as instrument the sex composition of children. Dujardin and Goffette-Nagot (2009) also
use the sex composition of children to identify the effect of public housing occupancy on
unemployment. In a slighly different setting, Goux and Maurin (2007) use information
on neighbors’ month of birth as an instrument to study the influence of neighbors on
educational outcomes. We are not aware of any use of such type of instruments in the
study of neighborhood effects on labor-market outcomes.
Besides these strategies to overcome self-selection issues, a stream of research has
adopted a completely different perspective which consists in evaluating how large selection
based on unobservables has to be to invalidate naive estimates (as suggested by Glaeser,
1996). Recent work by Altonji et al. (2002b, 2005, 2008) and by Krauth (2006, 2007) are
examples of such studies. In particular, in the absence of a relevant instrument, Altonji et
al. (2002b, 2005) use the amount of selection on observables as a guide to the amount of
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selection on unobservables to bound estimates of the effect of Catholic schools, a clearly
endogenous variable with respect to educational attainment.
As explained in details in Section 4, the present paper builds on the last two iden-
tification strategies highlighted above. In a first step, we resort to instrumental variables
and estimate a simultaneous model of unemployment and neighborhood type, using in-
struments defined at the individual level. In a second step, we use a strategy similar to
the one proposed by Altonji et al. (2005).
3 Data and basic evidence
3.1 Data
The empirical analysis conducted in this paper is based on data extracted from the 1999
French Population Census. It corresponds to a 1:20th sample of individuals for whom
detailed personal and household characteristics are provided (age, gender, education, em-
ployment status, occupational status, household type, etc) along with the characteristics
of the other members of his/her household. In addition, census data are particularly
useful in the context of neighborhood effects studies as it is (to our knowledge) the sole
dataset in France to provide information on residential location at a fine spatial scale: the
Iris zone. Iris zones are either municipalities if those have less than 10,000 inhabitants
and subdivisions of around 2,000 inhabitants otherwise. They have been created in order
to represent homogeneous entities in terms of housing and population. They are gener-
ally formed around well identified groups of buildings and respect frontiers such as main
avenues, rivers or railways. They will be called neighborhoods in the rest of the paper, for
the sake of simplicity. In addition to the 1:20th sample, census data also gathers summary
statistics at the neighborhood level, including indicators of the socioeconomic composition
of the population based on exhaustive information. These indicators will be used in the
next subsection to define a typology of neighborhoods based on the deprivation level, i.e.
the interest variable in our econometric model.
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This paper focuses on Lyon, the second largest city in France. Its agglomeration
(defined here by its urban unit) extends over a 958 km2 area and hosts around 1.3 million
inhabitants.2 It counts 540 neighborhoods3 which have on average 2,428 inhabitants, a
figure more or less comparable to the size of American Census tracts used in previous
studies of neighborhood effects in the U.S. Lyon is characterized by the existence of
pockets of poverty in the close periphery of its center (the so-called “banlieues”) and thus
appears to be an adequate case study to test for the existence of neighborhood effects.
Figure 1 maps the percentage of unemployed workers among labor-force participants at
the neighborhood level. In most American cities, central neighborhoods exhibit higher
unemployment rates than peripheral neighborhoods. In Lyon, the neighborhoods with the
lowest unemployment rates are also found in the far periphery, but Figure 1 shows that
the highest unemployment rates are found in the close periphery of Lyon’s municipality
and not in the center. The unemployment spatial structure is also quite related to the
distribution of educational levels, professional statuses and ethnic minorities. It is also
strongly related to the location of public housings, which is very typical of French cities
where public housing projects built in the 1970’s play a key role in spatially concentrating
low-income households. As a consequence, one can suspect the existence of neighborhood
effects affecting labor-market outcomes of individuals located in these neighborhoods.
3.2 Definition of deprived neighborhoods
Our empirical model estimates neighborhood effects on unemployment probabilities. We
have thus to define a relevant measure of neighborhood characteristics. Literature on
neighborhood effects shows that a wide variety of neighbors’ characteristics is likely to
affect individual unemployment propensity. Introducing all of them is not desirable be-
cause of the high degree of correlation observed between such variables, which may cause
2The urban unit, unite´ urbaine in French, is a set of municipalities, the territory of which is covered
by a built-up area of more than 2000 inhabitants, and in which buildings are separated by no more than
200 meters. The urban unit of Lyon consists of 102 municipalities. For practical reasons, we added three
municipalities which are enclosed within the urban unit of Lyon (Quincieux, Saint-Germain-au-Mont-
D’Or and Poleymieux-au-Mont-D’Or).
3A few Iris having less than 200 people had to be deleted for confidentiality reasons.
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instability in the parameters and significance levels (O’Regan and Quigley, 1998). Fur-
thermore, several authors (for example, Crane, 1991; Weinberg et al., 2004) suggest the
existence of potential threshold effects, which make the relationship between the level
of deprivation and the intensity of neighborhood effects non linear. Therefore, we don’t
introduce linearly a deprivation index in the unemployment equation but rather, and for
the sake of simplicity, a dummy variable representing the classification of a neighborhood
as deprived.
Consequently, we build a typology of neighborhoods aiming at reflecting for each
neighborhood its social composition and the ensuing neighborhood effects that potentially
affect labor-market outcomes. This classification is based on a set of variables chosen in
order to account for the most-often cited mechanisms by which neighborhood might affect
unemployment: distribution of population by educational levels, percentage of executives
and blue-collars in the labor force, percentage of unemployment and long-term unemploy-
ment, percentage of household heads of foreign nationality, and percentage of lone-parent
families. Each of these neighborhood characteristics is likely to affect individual unem-
ployment propensity: high unemployment rates as well as high rates of foreigners influence
the quality of social networks and decrease information on job opportunities; educational
levels, income levels (proxied by professional statuses) and the percentage of lone-parent
families are indicators of social and economic (un)success among neighbors, which gen-
erate contagion effects and a lack of role models; in addition, the percentage of foreign
household heads and lone-parent families are often correlated to various social deviances,
which give rise to stigmatization of neighborhoods. Note that we don’t seek to disentangle
these different mechanisms.
We treat this set of variables by means of standard factorial ecology methods (see for
example Johnston et al., 2004) in order to build a composite indicator of neighborhood
deprivation. We first run a Principal Component Analysis to define a number of non-
correlated factors summarizing the information carried by these variables. As usual, only
factors with eigenvalue above 1 are retained, that is in our case, two factors which together
account for 90% of the variance of the initial set of variables (see Table A.1 in Appendix).
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The deprivation index is then defined as a linear combination of these two factors, each
being weighted by the part of total variance it explains. The index ranges from -1.08 for
the less deprived neighborhood to 2.64 for the most deprived. In order to deal with a
dummy variable, we define cut-off values on this deprivation index in order to identify the
most deprived neighborhoods of Lyon. We use alternatively cut-off values corresponding
to the 35%, 25% and 15% most deprived neighborhoods, corresponding to deprivation
index above 0.10, 0.31 and 0.73 respectively. The 25% classification will be our baseline
neighborhood variable and will be used in most analyses, while the 35 and 15% will be
used to test the sensitivity or our results to a move of the classification threshold.
As can be seen from Figure 2, deprived neighborhoods are spread in different parts
of the city, still mostly concentrated in its eastern half. Table 1 shows the main charac-
teristics of the 25% most deprived neighborhoods, as opposed to the rest of the agglom-
eration. These deprived neighborhoods are characterized by high unemployment rates
(twice as high as the average unemployment rate in other neighborhoods), high percent-
age of foreigners (more than three times as high as in the rest of the agglomeration), low
educational levels and professional statuses (for example, the percentage of individuals
with a university degree is one third of the average corresponding percentage for other
neighborhoods).
3.3 Sample definition and first evidence
Our joint model of unemployment probability and neighborhood type deals only with
couple households, because the case of single adults suffers from a selection bias, young
adults being less likely to form a separate household if they are unemployed. Moreover,
the presence of a spouse gives us characteristics that will be used in the equation of
neighborhood type. Finally, because dealing with women would imply to explain not
only unemployment, but also labor-market participation, our study only concerns male
household heads. We select, from the 1:20th census sample, individuals aged 19 to 64 and
participating in the labor-market. Due to data availability on previous occupation, we
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delete individuals who never worked, that is only 18 individuals. The final sample contains
10,473 individuals, all of them being males. Our analysis therefore does not concern the
population of women nor that of young males at the beginning of their career.
Table 2 displays the sample statistics by neighborhood type defined with the 25%
threshold, for all exogenous variables that will be used in the empirical model. For each
explanatory variable, the percentage of the sample in the category as well as the mean
unemployment rate are provided.4 Deprived neighborhoods host one fifth of the individ-
uals in our sample. Compared to individuals in other neighborhoods, those in deprived
neighborhoods are less educated and have lower occupational statuses.5 Regarding de-
mographic variables, they have the same age structure but the proportion of foreigners is
higher in deprived neighborhoods than in the rest of the agglomeration. Unemployment
rates vary markedly with respect to the socioeconomic profile (younger individuals, for-
eigners, less educated and lower occupational statuses have higher unemployment rates),
but also with respect to the neighborhood type. On average, individuals residing in de-
prived neighborhoods are more often unemployed (11%, against 5% in the rest of the
agglomeration). Moreover, for each socioeconomic category, unemployment rates in de-
prived neighborhoods are higher than unemployment rates of the corresponding category
in the other neighborhoods.
This differenciated unemployment rate depending on neighborhood type raises sev-
eral interpretations. First, this could account for neighborhood effects that increase the
difficulties encountered by individuals on the labor-market when they live in a deprived
neighborhood, such as peer effects, lack of role models, poor social networks or territorial
discrimination. Second, this could be the consequence of a self-selection effect. Indeed,
as rents vary according to the type of neighborhood, the less successful individuals on the
4Note that these percentages are slightly different from those displayed in Table 1. Indeed, our sample
consists only of male heads of couple households aged 19-64, whereas Table 1 corresponds to the whole
population.
5In the whole paper, the following education levels will be used: No diploma, At most lower secondary
school, Vocational training, High school final diploma, University degree. They correspond to the fol-
lowing French categories: no reported diploma, CEP or Brevet, CAP or BEP, Baccalaure´at, DEUG or
above, respectively. As regards the occupational status, intermediate professions include teachers and
related, social and healthcare workers, clergy, civil service middle managers, sales and administrative
middle managers, technicians and supervisors.
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labor market and people with a low attachment to the labor market are more likely to
sort themselves into deprived neighborhoods (Zenou, 2008). Our econometric analysis is
intended to disentangle these two mechanisms.
4 Method
Our empirical model is intended to test for the existence of an effect of neighborhood de-
privation on unemployment. The classical theory of job search ends up in the estimation of
unemployment duration models, whereas the dataset we use only contains information on
the current employment status. We therefore estimate the probability of unemployment.
This reduced form is assumed to represent how the individual’s situation affects both the
arrival rate of job offers and his reservation wage. As already explained, neighborhood
deprivation is endogenous because unobserved individual characteristics that influence res-
idential choice are likely to influence labor-market outcomes. To control for endogeneity,
we estimate a simultaneous probit model of unemployment and neighborhood type. Our
first identification strategy is, classically, to use exclusion restrictions. However, because
instrument choice is always questionable, we consider a second identification strategy,
based on totally different assumptions, that has been proposed by Altonji et al. (2005).
In a nutshell, this identifying strategy consists in making assumptions as to the level of
selection on unobservables.
4.1 Empirical model and econometric method
The aim of our econometric model is to estimate jointly the unemployment probability
and the probability of living in a deprived neighborhood. We therefore have a bivariate
probit formed of an individual-level equation for unemployment and a household-level
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equation for the residential situation. It writes:

y1 = 1(αy2 +X
′β1 + u1 > 0)
y2 = 1(X












where y1 and y2 are the probability of unemployment and the probability to live in
a deprived neighborhood respectively. X is a vector of exogenous covariates influencing
the two outcomes (leaving aside the identification issue for the time being). The latent
variable determining unemployment is assumed to be influenced by the dummy y2 and
α is an estimate of the intensity of neighborhood effects on unemployment probability.
As we assume that the sorting of households into neighborhood types may be affected by
unobserved characteristics influencing also unemployment, the correlation term between
the residuals of the two probits (u1 and u2) is supposed to be non-zero and equal to ρ.
This simultaneous probit model includes an endogenous observed discrete variable
on its right hand side (the neighborhood type in the unemployment equation). It amounts
consequently to a mixed model. A coherency condition, which imposes a triangular form,
has to be verified in mixed models (Maddala, 1983; Blundell and Smith, 1994). The
observed variable of unemployment can not therefore be introduced in the neighborhood
type equation. However, unemployment is likely to affect the household’s income and
therefore the probability to live in a deprived neighborhood. To account for this influence,
we introduce all the observable characteristics determining unemployment probability in
the neighborhood equation. The presence of unobservables that determine unemployment
and therefore influence neighborhood type is likely to result in a correlation between
the error terms of the two equations. The simultaneous estimation ensures that this
correlation is explicitly dealt with, as the correlation matrix of error terms is estimated.6
6The relevance of this triangular specification can moreover be supported by the estimation of a
reverse specification, in which the neighborhood type is explained by unemployment and no effect of
neighborhood on unemployment is assumed. The estimation of such a model shows that there is no effect
of unemployment on neighborhood choice, once the effect of observed characteristics is controlled for
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Unemployment is explained, in a classical manner, by individual characteristics
relative to experience (that will be proxied by age and its square to allow for a non-
linear effect), education and previous occupation, because unemployment rates vary with
skill level and professional status. Due to potential discrimination by employers, indi-
vidual’s nationality is included. It is also supposed to influence, in conjunction with the
spouse’s nationality, the access to information on job opportunities through the network
of relatives. Because the spouse’s educational level might be suspected to influence the
individual’s participation on the labor market, it is also included in the unemployment
equation.
In the neighborhood equation, the educational levels of the individual and his
spouse, individual’s occupational status in previous job and age are proxies for the house-
hold’s income, which plays a central role in residential choice. Further, there is some
evidence that individuals of foreign origin are discriminated against on the renting mar-
ket and are therefore more likely to be accommodated in public housing and in low-income
neighborhoods. Dummies for the individual’s and his spouse’s nationalities account for
these effects.
In summary, X in system 4.1 is a vector of exogenous variables including a constant,
individual’s age and its square (expressed as units of ten years), nationality, diploma and
previous occupation as well as the spouse’s nationality and diploma (each of them being
a set of dummy variables).







iβ1 + αyi2), qi2(X
′
iβ2), qi1qi2ρ ] (4.2)
where qij = 2yij − 1 is equal to 1 whenever yij is 1 and to -1 whenever yij is 0, subscript
i denotes individual i and Φ2(.) is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function.
(results available from the authors on request).
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Such a system can be estimated by a maximum likelihood method. Endogeneity
tests amount to test the significance of the correlation coefficient of residuals (Greene,
1998). Note that standard errors have to be corrected for within-neighborhood depen-
dencies to account for common influences within neighborhoods, using Huber ajusted
standard errors (Wooldridge, 2003).
4.2 Instrumental variable identification
A simultaneous probit model is formally identified based on functional form (Wilde, 2000).
However, it is known that relying on functional form for identification can be misleading
and some restrictions are required to base identification on meaningful grounds.7 We
therefore use exclusion restrictions aimed at providing identification of the neighborhood
effect, under the form of a vector Z of covariates introduced in the equation of y2, which
gives:

y1 = 1(αy2 +X
′β1 + u1 > 0)
y2 = 1(X












The goal when choosing an exclusion restriction is to find a variable that affects the
choice of residential location while not being correlated with the probability of unemploy-
ment conditionally on the other covariates. In French cities, one important determinant of
residential location is accommodation in public housing, which is a strong factor of income
segregation. Indeed, a large part of the public housing stock was built under the form of
large projects in city outskirts and public housing renters are therefore concentrated in
specific neighborhoods. Still, being in public housing can not be considered, in our views,
as exogenous to unemployment. In a previous paper, we have shown that the gender
composition of children influences the probability for a household to be accommodated in
7See for instance the comparison between 2SLS and bivariate probit methods in Altonji (2002a).
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the public housing sector (Dujardin and Goffette-Nagot, 2009). The rationale for this is
that parents having children of different genders are less likely to have a third child and
this effect is stronger for those having first a girl. This ensues in a lower probability to be
housed in the public housing sector and then also in deprived neighborhoods. Indeed, Ta-
ble 2 shows that the percentage, among families with at least two children, of households
having first a girl and then a boy is lower in deprived neighborhoods. The gender compo-
sition of children is therefore likely to influence location in a deprived neighborhood and
it is our first instrument. It is however available only for households having two children
or more.
Given the size of the agglomeration, workplace location is also an important de-
terminant of residential location choice. We build a variable that takes value 1 if the
workplace of the spouse (the individual’s workplace not being usable for evident reasons)
is in the eastern outskirts, that is more specifically, in the group of municipalities delin-
eated on Figure A.1 in Appendix,8 where a large part of the deprived neighborhoods is
located. The variable takes value 0 when the spouse does not work or works in other
parts of the city. We observe that the household is more likely, ceteris paribus, to be
located in a deprived neighborhood when the spouse works in the eastern part of the city:
the percentage of households in deprived neighborhoods with this characteristic is 23.0%
against 14.1% in other neighborhoods (Table 2); the variable is highly significant in a
probit model of neighborhood type (Table 3).
We now examine the properties of these two instruments, i.e. their relevance and
validity. We perform this analysis on the basis of linear probability specifications of our
model, using a GMM estimation to deal with the heteroskedasticity of linear probability
models (see Baum et al., 2003). In this context, the relevance of the instrument Z means
that Cov(y∗2, Z|.) 6= 0, and the validity means that Cov(Z, u1) = 0 with u1 the error term
in the interest equation. The relevance of instruments will be evaluated using classical
8These communes (Vaulx-en-Velin, Ve´nissieux, De´cines, Bron, Saint-Priest, Lyon 8◦ arrondissement,
Villeurbanne, Saint-Fons, Feyzin) have been chosen so as to represent the main employment centers in
the eastern outskirts. A small municipality located between De´cines-Charpieu and Saint-Priest has not
been taken into account due to the small number of jobs it has.The 8th district of Lyon’s municipality
has been included because it concentrates a lot of jobs.
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F-tests performed on the 1st stage estimation, while the validity will be assessed, in
the specifications where we have two instruments, using overidentification tests based on
Hansen J statistic, which is adapted to GMM estimations.
Among our two instruments, only the spouse’s workplace can be used on the whole
sample. The gender composition of household’s children is a second instrument for the
subsample of families with at least two children. It allows us to perform an overidentifi-
cation test on this subsample and thus to assess the validity of the first intrument.
Beginning with the relevance of the spouse’s workplace instrument, the F statistic of
significance in the first stage is 28.6 for the whole sample (Table 3, column 2), when a rule
of thumb gives a threshold of 10 for a set of instruments to be considered as strong (Staiger
and Stock, 1997). As to the validity of this instrument, we have to show that the spouse’s
workplace is not correlated to the unobservables that affect the individual’s probability of
unemployment. We first note that the communes chosen for the definition of this dummy
do not host particularly low-skilled or temporarily jobs. On the contrary, this area has
firms working for instance in the pharmaceutical sector, in the computer industry and
four specialized hospitals. Therefore, it is not very likely that working in these communes
is associated with a low attachment to the labor market for the spouse or the individual.
In our sample, the percentage of unemployed is even smaller for the individuals whose
spouse works in this area (5.6% against 6.6% for the rest of the population, Table 2),
which can be explained by the fact that spouses of employed workers are more likely to
be employed due to assortative mating. However, this effect is fully explained by the
observed characteristics: a simple probit of individual’s unemployment probability shows
that when controlling for other covariates, the coefficient of the spouse’s workplace is not
significant at any conventional level.9
Considering the subsample of families with at least two children provides us with a
second instrument and thus with a formal validity test of the two instruments. We first
check that changing the sample does not change the relevance of the spouse’s workplace
9P-value 0.23, detailed results available from the authors on request.
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as an instrument. Table 3 (column 4) shows that, although a little less significant, the
spouse’s workplace is a strong enough instrument for the sample of families. Adding the
dummy for families having first a girl and then a boy decreases the global F statistic
(Table 3, column 5), due to the fact that the girl-boy dummy is significant at the 10%
level only. However, with a F statistic of 12.25, this set of instruments can be considered
as strong enough. Considering now the validity, we can first say that the children gender
dummy can safely be considered as exogenous, because it is not chosen by the parents
and there is no reason for it to affect the father’s unemployment probability.10 We then
consider the Hansen J statistic testing the joint validity of the two instruments. The value
of the statistic is 0.53 (p-value 0.47), which indicates that the null hypothesis that the two
intruments are jointly valid can not be rejected. The limits of this kind of tests are known:
they can provide missleading results, as the null of orthogonality may be unrejected when
the two instruments are endogenous but the biases that they induce are of similar sign
and magnitude. However, we claim that performing such a test with two instruments
having very different logics and of which one is clearly exogenous (the children gender
composition) gives more reliability to the test.
4.3 Identification a` la Altonji
As recalled above, the bivariate probit with an endogenous covariate is classically identified
by introducing exclusion restrictions. Other types of restrictions can serve as identification
means. As shown in a serie of papers by Altonji et al. (2002a, 2002b, 2005, 2008), it is
possible, instead of relying on potentially disputable instruments, to make assumptions
concerning the correlation between the unobservables determining the outcome and the
endogenous variable. Considering system 4.1, this amounts to place constraints on the
parameter ρ and allows to have a restriction ensuring the identification of the endogenous
variable coefficient.
Altonji et al. (2005) present their framework as consisting in making hypotheses
10See Angrist and Evans (1998) and Goux and Maurin (2005) for the use of this characteristic as a
valid instrument.
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as to the selection into the treatment (the endogenous variable) based on unobservables
and seeing how the estimated effect of the endogenous variable varies depending on these
hypotheses. The basic idea is that the degree of selection on observables into the treatment
may be used as a guide for the degree of selection produced by unobservables. The extreme
hypothesis of an equal amount of selection on observables and unobservables allows the
identification of a point estimate.
We briefly present here the conditions under which an “equal selection” based on
observables and unobservables can be reasonably assumed. The details and justification
of these conditions are formalized in Altonji et al. (2002b). The idea of “equal selection”
considers that the outcome is determined by a set of factors, a part of which only is
observable. If this set is large, so that none of these elements dominates the distribution of
the outcome and of the endogenous variable, and if the observables are randomly selected
among this set, then, because the observables and unobservables are treated symetrically,
the treatment has the same relationship to the explained part of the outcome than to its
unexplained part. A third hypothesis is required for equal selection to hold: the regression
of y∗2 on y
∗
1 − αy2 (with y∗1 and y∗2 the latent variables determining the outcome and the
endogenous binary variable respectively) has to be equal to the regression of the part of
y∗2 that is orthogonal to X on the corresponding part of y
∗
1−αy2 (see Altonji et al., 2002b,
for proof).
Under this set of assumptions, a formal condition is obtained that translates in the
bivariate probit case to:
ρ =
Cov(X ′β2, X ′β1)
V ar(X ′β1)
(4.4)
In words, the condition of equal selection on observables and unobservables amounts to
placing a restriction on the correlation coefficient of the errors of the bivariate probit,
which allows to obtain a point estimate of the coefficient of the endogenous variable.
Because the hypothesis concerning the selection on unobservables provides an identify-
ing assumption, no exclusion restriction is required and the bivariate probit writes as
system 4.1.
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We can know discuss whether the conditions for equal selection on observables and
unobservables hold in our case. Variables that determine whether a person is unemployed
at a point in time are diverse. We can consider them to be numerous and pertaining
to different domains. Those domains are the personal characteristics determining skills
(educational background, experience, other traits such as personal motivation), the char-
acteristics of the local labor market, the sector of activity and the type of position in
previous job, the social network of the person and personal characteristics that might
serve as a basis for discrimination. Our covariates cover those different domains: edu-
cation and age relate to skills and experience, nationality may generate discrimination,
occupational status gives a proxy for the type of employment, while the spouse’s educa-
tional level and nationality are proxies for the quality of the social network. However, it
seems likely that those variables are strong determinants of unemployment probability.
Moreover, age, occupation and education of the individual and education of his spouse
are very important in determining the household’s income, and therefore neighborhood
choice. The condition of equal selection on unobservables and observables seems therefore
too strong in our case. However, Altonji et al. (2002b) argue that in practice, this as-
sumption can be viewed as giving a lower bound of the treatment effect, while the biased
probit estimate provides an upper bound.11
We will therefore follow Altonji et al. (2005) and give three types of results:
• Sensitivity analysis: The bivariate probit is estimated with the correlation coefficient
being constrained to different values, which serve as identification assumptions. This
allows to scan the estimated effect of the endogenous variable over different values
of the correlation.
• Equal selection: We assume the equality of selection on observables and unobserv-
ables. The likelihood of the bivariate probit is maximized under this constraint and
a point estimate of the neighborhood effect is obtained.
• Assessing the amount of selection on unobservables required to explain the probit
11Krauth (2006) gives a formal demonstration of this idea in a slightly different case.
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estimate: Following Altonji et al. (2005), one can formalize how large selection on
unobservables is relative to selection on observables by writing:
E(u1|y2 = 1)− E(u1|y2 = 0)
var(u1)
= λ
E(X ′β1|y2 = 1)− E(X ′β1|y2 = 0)
var(X ′β1)
(4.5)
This equation represents that the relationship between the treatment and the mean
index of unobservables that determine the outcome is λ times as strong as the
relationship between the treatment and the mean index of observables, after ad-
justments for variances. The condition of equality of selection on observables and
unobservables (condition 4.4) is equivalent to λ = 1.
It is then possible to compute how large λ, that is the selection on unobservables
relative to the selection on the index of observables, would have to be for the naive
estimate obtained in the probit to be entirely explained by selection. Altonji et al.









with y˜2 the residual of a regression of y2 on X.
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5 Results
Two kinds of results are presented in this section: results of the simultaneaous probit
model with exclusion restrictions in Section 5.1 and robustness checks based on the iden-
tification strategy proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) in Section 5.2.
12More precisely, let’s note X ′β2 and y˜2 the predicted value and residual of a regression of y2 on X,
so that y˜2 is orthogonal to X ′β2. Treating α, the coefficient of the endogenous, as if it were estimated
by a linear regression of the latent variable y∗1 on y2 and X and supposing that the bias in the probit
equation is the same as the one based on an OLS estimation, the estimated coefficient verifies: plim αˆ =
α+ var(y2)var(y˜2) [E(u1|y2 = 1)−E(u1|y2 = 0)]. Replacing E(u1|y2 = 1)−E(u1|y2 = 0) by its expression from
4.5 and supposing that there is no endogenous effect (α = 0), it is possible to solve for λ (reminding that
var(u1) = 1) which gives formula 4.6.
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5.1 Simultaneous probit model estimates
Table 4 presents marginal effects of the simultaneous probit of neighborhood deprivation
(defined here as the 25% most deprived neighborhoods) and unemployment for the whole
sample with the spouse’s workplace as an instrument (columns 2-3) and for families with
at least two children with two different instrumentations. The first one uses the spouse’s
workplace (columns 4-5), whereas the second has two instruments: the spouse’s workplace
and the gender composition of children (columns 6-7).
On the whole sample, the probability to live in a deprived neighborhood is influenced
by the individual’s and his spouse’s nationality (column 3). Being of foreign nationality
increases by about 10 points the probability to live in a deprived neighborhood. Being
of French nationality born abroad increases this probability by 6 points. The effect of
education level is quite strong as well. Having no diploma or at most a lower secondary
education raises the likelihood to be in a deprived neighborhood. Note that the effect
of the spouse’s education is higher than that of the individual: the possibility to have a
second wage in the household and the level of this wage particularly influences residential
choice. Finally, the professional category also markedly impacts neighborhood choice,
with the expected effect. We also observe the effect of the two instruments, that were
already commented in Section 4.2. Families with at least two children behave in the same
way, with an additional effect of age, younger families being more likely to live in deprived
neighborhoods.
There are not much differences between the two samples as to the determinants of
unemployment (columns 2 and 4). The probability of unemployment has a non-monotonic
relationship with age, with a minimum at age 44. Compared to the intermediate profession
category, individuals who were formerly independant workers or executives are less likely
to be unemployed. A slight effect of diploma is also observed, the low categories having
higher probabilities of unemployment. This effect appears both through the individual’s
and his spouse’s education, which can be attributed to the fact that the spouse’s diploma
is a proxy for the quality of the social network of the household and to assortative mating.
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There is a rather strong effect of the individual’s nationality, which is more intense for
individuals of foreign nationality than for individuals of French nationality born in France.
Finally, we observe that the coefficient of neighborhood type is unsignificant what-
ever the sample and for the two instrumentations in the case of families with two children
and more. By comparison, a probit estimation of unemployment yields a marginal effect
of living in a deprived neighborhood of 2.1 probability points on the whole sample (column
2 of Table 3) and 2.6 probability points on the sample of families with children (column 4
of Table 3), which is comparable in magnitude to the effect of being French born abroad.
Of course, we know that this effect is a naive estimate of the real neighborhood effect,
because the single probit estimation does not control for the endogeneity of neighborhood
type. This naive effect completely disappears once the endogeneity of residential location
is accounted for. Note that the estimated coefficient is even negative on the whole sample,
which, as will be explained in the next section, is consistent with the high positive value
of the residuals’ correlation coefficient. However, neither the neighborhood coefficient,
nor the correlation coefficient are significant in any of the three models.
In summary, the estimated results for the whole sample and for the subsample with
children are consistent, showing an absence of effect of living in a deprived neighborhood
on unemployment. It is important to recall that our instrumentation relies on two instru-
ments having very different logics and that passed the instrument validity test run on the
sample of families with at least two children. Moreover, the GMM estimation of the linear
probability model allows to calculate the Stock-Wright statistic, which is a test of the two
joint hypotheses that the instruments are valid and that the coefficient of the endogenous
variable is null (Baum et al., 2003). For the three estimations, the Stock-Wright statistic
shows that these hypotheses can not be rejected at any conventional level (Table 3). This
result is useful in particular for the whole sample, for which it provides a formal test of
exogeneity of the only instrument available in this case and an additional result in favor
of the absence of effect of neighborhood deprivation on unemployment probability.
In order to establish more firmly our results, we provide in the following robustness
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checks that have two goals: (i) to use a completely different identification strategy that
does not rely on the quality of instruments; (ii) to explore the robustness of our main
result to a different neighborhood classification and to a focus on different subpopulations.
Indeed, even if there is no effect of being in the 25% most deprived neighborhoods, would
it be that concentrating the analysis on the most deprived neighborhood gives a different
result? Moreover, because the intensity of neighborhood effects is likely to vary depending
especially on education, we may find neighborhood effects on subsamples defined on the
basis of educational levels. Note that the subsample of families with two children and more
was useful to have a second instrument allowing to test for the validity of the spouse’s
workplace as an instrument. As the rest of our analysis does not rely on instrumental
variables, the following results concern the whole sample.
5.2 Analysis a` la Altonji
Table 5 presents in three different panels the results of the different identifying assump-
tions presented in section 4.3, which consists in (i) estimating the effect of living in a
deprived neighborhood for different constraints on the value of the correlation coefficient
ρ (panel A), (ii) estimating the neighborhood effect assuming the equality of selection on
observables and unobservables (panel B) and (iii) estimating what amount of selection
on unobservables would be needed, relative to the selection on observables, to completely
explain the effect of deprived neighborhood found in naive probits (panel C). This is done
for three different neighborhood classifications (the baseline 25% classification as well as
the 35% and 15% classifications) and for three educational samples: the whole sample
(10,473 individuals), the low-educated (education up to A-level; 5,737 individuals) and
the higher-educated (university level diploma; 4,736 individuals). This gives nine combi-
nations of neighborhood classification and educational subsamples, which correspond to
the different columns of Table 5.
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5.2.1 Sensitivity to correlation in unobservables
Estimated coefficients of the neighborhood variable corresponding to a correlation coef-
ficient varying between 0.00 and 0.25 are presented in panel A of Table 5. Assuming
that unobservables determining the two outcomes are not correlated (i.e. ρ = 0) corre-
sponds to the probit estimate and yields in the nine cases positive effects for deprived
neighborhood, as already observed in Table 3. As expected, assuming a higher correla-
tion of unobservables decreases the estimated effect of neighborhood in all the cases we
consider. For the whole sample and whatever the neighborhood classification, the effect
of neighborhood type vanishes when the correlation is increased from 0.05 to 0.1. We
even observe that imposing a correlation above 0.15 yields negative marginal effects. This
observation is consistent with the sorting of individuals into neighborhood types. Indeed,
imposing a high positive correlation of the error terms assumes that the individuals that
have unobserved characteristics that favor the location in deprived neighborhoods also
have unobservables that increase their unemployment probability. For this to be consis-
tent with a moderate probit marginal effect, it has to be that the neighborhood type itself
has a favorable effect on unemployment. In other words, the higher the sorting based on
unobservables, the lower is the real effect of neighborhood for a given probit estimate, up
to a negative effect.
It is also worth noting that the estimated neighborhood effect varies monotonically
with the correlation coefficient. This result shows that it will be possible, as suggested by
Altonji et al. (2002b), to build a confidence interval for the neighborhood effect based on
assumptions as to the domain covered by the correlation of unobservables.
Focusing more particularly on the differences between the two educational sub-
samples, we first note that the neighborhood type coefficient varies with respect to the
subsamples and with the neighborhood classification within each subsample. However,
their standard deviations do not permit to make any conclusion as to the differences be-
tween these estimates, as confidence intervals of the point estimates overlap. Furthermore,
we expect that working on subsamples defined based on education decreases the share of
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explanatory power of the model that is due to observable characteristics and therefore
gives more weight to unobservables. As a result, the positive effect of neighborhood type
estimated on these two subsamples is expected, when imposing some correlation on un-
observables, to disappear more quickly than for the whole sample. This is indeed what
is observed in our results. In particular, the effect of living in the 15% more deprived
neighborhoods for the low educated is divided by almost three with a 0.05 correlation
compared to the probit estimate. This means that the 2.1 marginal effect given by the
probit model in this case is very possibly entirely due to the effect of selection on unob-
servables. This is true for the two educational subsamples, whatever the neighborhood
classification retained. The only exception concerns the highly educated in the 15% most
deprived neighborhoods, for whom a higher correlation is required for the 4.0 marginal
effect to be explained by selection based on unobservables. But the effect still vanishes at
a low level of correlation, actually between 0.05 and 0.1.
In summary, this sensitivity analysis shows that a small correlation of unobservables
affecting the two outcomes of interest would be sufficient to produce the neighborhood
effect that is estimated based on probit models. This result is robust with respect to
subsamples defined based on education and to the particular threshold used for the neigh-
borhood classification. However, the actual magnitude of the correlation of unobservables
is of course unknown. This is why, following Altonji et al. (2005), we continue the anal-
ysis by using the amount of selection on observables as a benchmark for the amount of
selection on unobservables.
5.2.2 Assuming as much selection on unobservables than on observables
We consider here the assumption of equal selection into neighborhood types based on ob-
servables and unobservables. Panel B of Table 5 gives the neighborhood marginal effect for
the bivariate probit (equation 4.1) estimated under the constraint ρ = Cov(X ′β2, X ′β1)/
V ar(X ′β1) and the resulting correlation coefficient. The estimated correlation coefficients
are high, reflecting the high level of correlation in the explained part of the two outcomes,
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neighborhood type and unemployment. This ensues from the high level of urban segre-
gation along age, education, nationality and occupational status, which are all important
determinants of unemployment as well. Imposing such a high level of correlation of un-
observables yields, in conformity with the results of the sensitivity analysis, negative
coefficients for the neighborhood type in the unemployment equation. Such a negative
effect of neighborhood deprivation is of course unlikely to be real and reflects rather that
such a high level of correlation is unlikely to hold in the data.
As developed in Section 4, the assumption of equal selection is in our case an extreme
hypothesis. Indeed, as our observed variables include age, education and nationality, we
can think that very important determinants of neighborhood choice are already taken
into account. As a result, we think that the real amount of selection on unobservables is
likely to be lower than the selection on observables, but still strictly positive. Given this
and given that the previous subsection showed that the effect of neighborhood decreases
monotonically with the correlation of unobservables, one can consider the neighborhood
effect estimated under the assumption of equal selection as a lower bound of the real
neighborhood effect and the estimate obtained with the probit model, which considers
that there is no selection based on unobservables, as the upper bound. All the hypotheses
between these two benchmarks can be considered. It is then important to note that in the
nine cases considered in Table 5, the lower value for the effect of neighborhood is negative,
which means that the zero value, which is the result of the IV identification method, is
in the confidence interval for the value of the neighborhood effect constructed based on
the two extreme hypotheses of equal selection and no selection. Furthermore, a strictly
positive effect of neighborhood type holds only if the level of selection on unobservables
is low. In the following, a more informal analysis is carried, that assesses the amount of
selection on unobservables required to explain the probit effect.
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5.2.3 Amount of correlation of unobservables required for the probit neigh-
borhood effect to be entirely due to the endogeneity bias
We finally turn to the last robustness check, which consists in evaluating how strong the
selection on unobservables needs to be, relative to the selection on observables, so as to
discard any effect of neighborhood type. The results of this step are in the last panel of
Table 5.
The two previous series of results showed, for instance for the whole sample and
the 15% classification, that a 0.10 correlation of unobservables (ρ) is enough to can-
cel out the probit marginal effect and that the correlation in the indexes of observables
(Cov(X ′β2, X ′β1)/V ar(X ′β1)) is 0.81. Results for the other classifications and for the
two subsamples are similar. Accordingly, it is expected that a level of selection on unob-
servables small in front of the selection on observables is enough to cancel out the effect
of neighborhood type.
Consistent with this observation, we find that a very low level of selection on unob-
servables relatively to the selection on observables is enough to explain the positive probit
estimate of neighborhood type in all the cases. For the whole sample and whatever the
neighborhood classification, a selection on unobservables as low as 6% of the selection on
observables is enough to produce the estimated probit effect. Only in the case of the low
educated sample and the 35% neighborhood classification is the quantity of required se-
lection on unobservables slightly above 10% of the selection on observables. This remains
however low, and allows us to conclude that this result is a strong argument against the
existence of any effect of neighborhood type on unemployment probability in our data.
5.3 Results synthesis
Our results show that being in a deprived neighborhood could increase the probability of
unemployment by 2.1 points if one were to take the probit estimate at face value. However,
this estimate clearly suffers from an endogeneity bias and can only be considered as a
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higher bound of the real neighborhood effect. The lower bound of the estimated effect is
obtained when considering that the correlation of unobservables influencing neighborhood
type and unemployment is as high as the correlation of observable determinants. This is of
course an extreme assumption, that leads to an implausible negative effect of neighborhood
deprivation on unemployment probability. In any case, the real neighborhood effect is on
this interval, which contains the null value.
For example, for the whole sample and the 15% neighborhood classification again,
the naive probit marginal effect is 2.5 probability points. The sensitivity analysis shows
that this effect decreases rapidly when the correlation is fixed to higher values. Assuming
as much selection on unobservables as on observables, that is 0.82, leads to an implausi-
ble negative effect of -16.3 probability points. The real neighborhood effect lies on this
interval. It is very likely that even if not as high as the correlation on observables, some
selection on unobservables happens, and the sensitivity analysis shows that a correlation
of unobservables slightly above 0.05 produces a null marginal effect of neighborhood type.
This set of results is sufficient to conclude that being located in the 15% most deprived
neighborhoods in Lyon has no effect on unemployment probability. The results in the
other cases are of similar magnitude.
Finally, the informal computation suggested by Altonji et al. (2005) reported in
section 5.2.3 shows that the correlation of unobservables being only 5 to 10% of the
correlation of observables is enough to explain the positive effect estimated in probit
models. Such a low level of correlation is very likely to happen in such a context, although
these results per se are not enough to formally reject a positive effect of neighborhood
deprivation on unemployment.
Consistently, the results of the simultaneous probit model, of which identification
relies on a valid instrumentation, also points to a null effect of neighborhood deprivation
on unemployment probability. All these results give converging elements based on dif-
ferent points of view. As a result, we are allowed to conclude that we were not able to
demonstrate the existence of any neighborhood effect on unemployment in Lyon.
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6 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to examine how unemployment probabilities are influenced
by location in a deprived neighborhood in a French city (Lyon). However, estimating
properly the effect of neighborhood composition on unemployment is a difficult task,
because labor-market outcomes and residential choices are intrinsically related. Therefore,
it raises the issue of location choice endogeneity which, if not corrected for, is likely to
bias the estimates of neighborhood effects. No perfect solution to this problem exists at
present.
In this context, the main contribution of our work is to use two different identifica-
tion strategies, which provide converging results. First, we estimate a simultaneous model
of two probit equations, one for unemployment probability, and the second for location
in a deprived neighborhood, allowing for non zero correlation between the error terms of
both equations. Identification is achieved classically through exclusion restrictions on the
basis of two instruments: the gender composition of household’s children and an indica-
tor variable for the spouse working in the eastern outskirts of the agglomeration. Results
show that the naive detrimental effect found in simple probits completely disappears with
the simultaneous probit estimates, whatever the instrument used and for both the whole
sample and the sample of families with at least two children. Second, we estimate the same
simultaneous model, without exclusion restrictions but imposing different constraints on
the correlation between error terms, which permit point identification of neighborhood
effects. This second strategy amounts to making hypotheses as to the degree of selection
into deprived neighborhoods based on unobservables. Using different hypotheses as to
this selection leads to the same result as the IV method: under reasonable assumptions
as to this selection, it is not possible to demonstrate the existence of any significant effect
of neighborhood deprivation on unemployment probability. Sensitivity analyses based on
different subsamples defined on the basis of educational level and different neighborhood
classifications also yield converging results.
In conclusion, our results do not provide any support to the hypothesis according
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to which living in a deprived neighborhood increases unemployment probabilities, once
the endogeneity of residential choices is dealt with. It therefore highlights the importance
of properly taking endogeneity into account in neighborhood effects studies. Besides, our
results converge with those obtained in quasi-experimental designs which do not show any
significant effect of residential moves on labor-market outcomes (Kling et al., 2007). Our
result is also consistent with findings by Bolster et al. (2007), who show the absence of
neighborhood effect on income dynamics, using panel data.
This result suggests that neighborhood effects found in naive models, as simple
probit estimates, are in fact entirely due to the sorting into deprived neighborhoods of
individuals with unobserved characteristics that are detrimental in finding a job. However,
this result does not mean that public policies targeting specific neighborhoods, instead of
specific individuals, are unneeded. Indeed, as highlighted by Bolster et al. (2007), given
the high level of spatial sorting of households by socioeconomic category and also with
a smaller intensity by unobserved characteristics, targeting specific areas is probably an
easy way of targeting specific groups of individuals. Moreover, whereas it seems from our
results that neighborhood deprivation has no effect on unemployment, it could well have
an effect on other outcomes, such as adolescent educational outcomes or health.
Finally, we would like to stress the methodological contribution of our work. Indeed,
neighborhood effects studies based on cross-section data are hampered by the difficulty
of finding valid instruments. We hope that our analysis will show that it is possible, by
exploiting the complementarity between the IV method and the a` la Altonji approach, to
provide robust results in this research area. This is a new track of research, that should
reveal particularly fruitful in a domain where the identification issue is so crucial, and in
contexts where quasi-experimental situations are scarce.
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Factor 1 Factor 2
Eigenvalue 4.19 4.61
Percent of variance explained 41.86% 46.15%
Loadings
% families with foreign household head 0.816 -0.399
% monoparental households 0.793 -0.120
% pop. with at most lower secondary education 0.510 -0.824
% pop. with high school final diploma -0.291 0.949
% pop. with a university degree -0.212 0.968
% executives -0.244 0.931
% blue-collars 0.486 -0.820
% unemployed workers 0.921 -0.308
% unemployed workers since more than one year 0.908 -0.314
% unemployed workers aged under 25 0.730 -0.437
Only factors with eigenvalues superior or equal to 1 were retained.
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Figure 2: Neighborhood typology
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Deprived neighborhoods Other neighborhoods Total
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
Public housing units (%) 51.9 0.0 98.5 11.1 0.0 70.9 21.3
Demography
Foreign household heads (%) 23.1 0.0 56.9 6.9 0.0 20.8 10.9
Lone-parent families (%) 18.9 7.1 33.3 11.8 0.0 28.6 13.5
Education levels
At most secondary edu. (%) 54.8 35.9 69.7 35.1 19.2 51.2 40.1
University degree (%) 10.6 4.0 34.9 29.3 7.2 54.3 24.6
Unemployment
Unemployed workers (%) 20.3 9.8 37.3 9.6 4.0 20.4 12.3
Unemp. for more than 1 year (%) 11.1 4.6 22.0 4.7 1.3 11.2 6.3
Occupational status
Blue-collars (%) 38.0 14.2 62.9 16.2 2.8 46.0 21.7
Executives (%) 5.5 0.0 24.5 21.0 2.8 47.6 17.1
Population 2369 270 5041 2443 247 5730 2425
Total population 322,254 994,540 1,316,794
Number of neighborhoods 136 407 543
Table 1: Mean characteristics of neighborhood by type (25% most deprived neighborhoods
versus others)
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25% most deprived Other Total
neighborhoods neighborhoods
% of % in % of % in % of % in
category unempl. category unempl. category unempl.
Number of observations 2215 11.1 8258 5.2 10,473 6.4
Personal characteristics
Age
=< 30 15.6 11.8 14.4 5.8 14.6 7.2
> 30 and =< 45 47.2 11.9 47.1 4.8 47.2 6.3
> 45 37.2 9.7 38.5 5.4 38.2 6.3
Nationality
French born in France 64.6 7.8 84.7 4.4 80.5 5.0
French born abroad 13.8 11.1 9.0 7.0 10.0 8.2
Foreign nationality 21.6 20.7 6.3 12.6 9.5 16.5
Education
No diploma 26.3 16.5 10.2 8.4 13.6 11.7
At most lower sec. edu. 16.6 11.4 11.7 7.2 12.7 8.4
Vocational training 33.9 8.5 27.0 5.3 28.4 6.1
High school final diploma 9.9 9.1 13.5 4.6 12.7 5.3
University diploma 13.2 7.9 37.7 3.8 32.5 4.1
Occupational status
Farmer or independent worker 6.6 7.5 11.3 2.8 10.3 3.4
Executive 7.8 6.9 28.9 3.2 24.4 3.5
Intermediate professions 18.7 7.5 27.5 5.4 25.6 5.7
Office worker 12.4 9.8 9.0 4.9 9.7 6.3
Blue-collar 54.5 13.6 23.3 8.6 29.9 10.5
Characteristics of the spouse
Education
No diploma 26.4 14.4 9.0 10.1 12.7 11.9
At most lower sec. edu. 19.1 12.7 14.7 5.8 15.7 7.6
Vocational training 27.2 9.6 20.9 4.9 22.2 6.1
High school final diploma 11.5 8.6 17.6 4.0 16.3 4.7
University diploma 15.7 7.8 37.8 4.5 33.1 4.8
Nationality
French born in France 67.0 8.6 86.0 4.5 82.0 5.3
French born abroad 12.1 13.0 8.2 6.3 9.1 8.2
Foreign nationality 20.1 17.7 5.8 13.0 8.9 15.3
Household characteristics
Girl-Boy (a) 23.0 12.5 25.2 4.3 24.7 6.1
Spouse works in eastern outskirts 23.5 7.1 15.1 4.9 16.8 5.6
(a) For households having at least 2 children
Table 2: Summary statistics of the estimation sample
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All individuals >= 2 children
Unemp. Neighb. Unemp. Neighb. Neighb.
Deprived neighborhood (25%) 0.0213*** 0.0265***
(0.0063) (0.0082)
Personal characteristics
Age (x 10 yrs) -0.0808*** -0.0448 -0.0840** -0.3066*** -0.3038***
(0.0179) (0.0372) (0.0369) (0.0735) (0.0734)
Squared-age (x 10 yrs) 0.0092*** 0.0032 0.0092** 0.0325*** 0.0321***
(0.0022) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0084) (0.0084)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0560*** 0.0942*** 0.0711*** 0.0895*** 0.0900***
(0.0133) (0.0204) (0.0201) (0.0293) (0.0294)
French born abroad 0.0200** 0.0600*** 0.0368*** 0.0714*** 0.0715***
(0.0088) (0.0147) (0.0126) (0.0207) (0.0207)
Education
No diploma 0.0176 0.0582*** 0.0161 0.0414* 0.0413
(0.0118) (0.0178) (0.0145) (0.0251) (0.0251)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0186* 0.0435** 0.0131 0.0280 0.0277
(0.0111) (0.0181) (0.0143) (0.0267) (0.0267)
Vocational training 0.0018 0.0229 0.0002 0.0185 0.0180
(0.0086) (0.0150) (0.0111) (0.0233) (0.0233)
High school final diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma -0.0017 -0.0273* 0.0148 -0.0134 -0.0143
(0.0093) (0.0148) (0.0144) (0.0251) (0.0250)
Occupational status
Farmer or independent worker -0.0291*** -0.0473*** -0.0191** -0.0456** -0.0454**
(0.0063) (0.0140) (0.0094) (0.0222) (0.0223)
Executive -0.0188*** -0.0677*** -0.0146 -0.0698*** -0.0696***
(0.0067) (0.0115) (0.0094) (0.0200) (0.0200)
Intermediate professions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Office worker -0.0079 0.0652*** -0.0026 0.1214*** 0.1228***
(0.0079) (0.0176) (0.0116) (0.0277) (0.0278)
Blue-collar 0.0099 0.1046*** 0.0100 0.1313*** 0.1325***
(0.0072) (0.0146) (0.0097) (0.0222) (0.0222)
Characteristics of the spouse
Education
No diploma 0.0197* 0.1353*** 0.0129 0.1551*** 0.1538***
(0.0104) (0.0200) (0.0136) (0.0282) (0.0282)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0160* 0.0761*** 0.0111 0.0880*** 0.0866***
(0.0092) (0.0160) (0.0127) (0.0266) (0.0266)
Vocational training 0.0067 0.0768*** 0.0055 0.0902*** 0.0889***
(0.0078) (0.0145) (0.0105) (0.0238) (0.0238)
High school final diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma 0.0118 -0.0141 0.0009 -0.0244 -0.0247
(0.0080) (0.0129) (0.0109) (0.0217) (0.0217)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0166 0.1188*** 0.0172 0.1426*** 0.1407***
(0.0114) (0.0232) (0.0149) (0.0298) (0.0296)
French born abroad 0.0161* 0.0675*** 0.0100 0.0777*** 0.0773***
(0.0089) (0.0181) (0.0102) (0.0238) (0.0237)
Instruments




Test on instruments from GMM estimation of linear probability models
First stage F-test [p-value] 28.57 [0.000] 23.32 [0.000] 12.25 [0.000]
Stock-Wright [p-value] 1.90 [0.168] 0.00 [0.948] 0.53 [0.769]
Overid. test Hansen J [p-value] - - 0.530 [0.466]
Log-likelihood -2349 -4604 -978.4 -2143 -2141
Pseudo-R2 0.0597 0.148 0.0999 0.192 0.192
Number of observations 10,473 4849
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Figures in parentheses give standard errors, corrected for within-neighborhood dependencies.
All models use 25% most deprived neighborhoods as neighborhood variable and are for all individuals in the
sample (low and high educated together).
Table 3: Marginal effects from simple probits of unemployment and location in deprived
neighborhoods
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All individuals >= 2 children
Exclusions Spouse’s workplace Spouse’s workplace Spouse’s workplace
& Girl-Boy
Unemp. Neighb. Unemp. Neighb. Unemp. Neighb.
Deprived neighborhood (25%) -0.0329 0.0106 0.0026
(0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0306)
Personal characteristics
Age (x 10 yrs) -0.0852*** -0.0465 -0.0888** -0.3080*** -0.0918** -0.3055***
(0.0196) (0.0372) (0.0391) (0.0735) (0.0398) (0.0733)
Squared-age (x 10 yrs) 0.0096*** 0.0035 0.0097** 0.0327*** 0.0100** 0.0324***
(0.0023) (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0084) (0.0046) (0.0084)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0672*** 0.0931*** 0.0734*** 0.0892*** 0.0748*** 0.0895***
(0.0171) (0.0203) (0.0213) (0.0293) (0.0216) (0.0293)
French born abroad 0.0257** 0.0590*** 0.0384*** 0.0709*** 0.0394*** 0.0707***
(0.0107) (0.0147) (0.0134) (0.0208) (0.0137) (0.0208)
Education
No diploma 0.0231* 0.0577*** 0.0169 0.0412 0.0174 0.0411
(0.0131) (0.0179) (0.0144) (0.0251) (0.0146) (0.0252)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0224* 0.0434** 0.0135 0.0278 0.0138 0.0275
(0.0119) (0.0182) (0.0143) (0.0267) (0.0143) (0.0267)
Vocational training 0.0037 0.0223 0.0005 0.0183 0.0006 0.0178
(0.0090) (0.0151) (0.0111) (0.0234) (0.0112) (0.0233)
High school final diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma -0.0028 -0.0279* 0.0147 -0.0136 0.0147 -0.0146
(0.0096) (0.0148) (0.0145) (0.0251) (0.0145) (0.0250)
Occupational status
Farmer or independent worker -0.0323*** -0.0478*** -0.0197** -0.0457** -0.0201** -0.0455**
(0.0069) (0.0139) (0.0093) (0.0222) (0.0094) (0.0222)
Executive -0.0225*** -0.0680*** -0.0153 -0.0700*** -0.0158* -0.0699***
(0.0076) (0.0114) (0.0094) (0.0199) (0.0095) (0.0199)
Intermediate professions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Office worker -0.0040 0.0647*** -0.0009 0.1214*** 0.0001 0.1228***
(0.0092) (0.0177) (0.0124) (0.0278) (0.0128) (0.0278)
Blue-collar 0.0185* 0.1042*** 0.0123 0.1313*** 0.0136 0.1324***
(0.0105) (0.0145) (0.0114) (0.0222) (0.0118) (0.0222)
Characteristics of the spouse
Education
No diploma 0.0314** 0.1354*** 0.0156 0.1555*** 0.0171 0.1545***
(0.0148) (0.0199) (0.0156) (0.0283) (0.0161) (0.0283)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0222* 0.0756*** 0.0125 0.0882*** 0.0134 0.0868***
(0.0114) (0.0160) (0.0136) (0.0266) (0.0139) (0.0266)
Vocational training 0.0123 0.0765*** 0.0069 0.0904*** 0.0077 0.0891***
(0.0097) (0.0145) (0.0114) (0.0238) (0.0117) (0.0238)
High school final diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma 0.0115 -0.0143 0.0009 -0.0240 0.0008 -0.0241
(0.0082) (0.0129) (0.0109) (0.0218) (0.0109) (0.0218)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0267* 0.1191*** 0.0199 0.1426*** 0.0215 0.1406***
(0.0140) (0.0231) (0.0159) (0.0297) (0.0163) (0.0295)
French born abroad 0.0218** 0.0674*** 0.0113 0.0776*** 0.0120 0.0772***
(0.0108) (0.0181) (0.0107) (0.0238) (0.0110) (0.0237)
Instruments




Correlation of residuals 0.301 (0.1932) 0.0853 (0.1668) 0.133 (0.1802)
LR test (ρ12 = 0) [p-value] 2.135 [0.144] 0.259 [0.611] 0.528 [0.467]
Log-likelihood -6952 -3121 -3119
Pseudo-R2 0.120 0.165 0.166
Number of observations 10473 4849 4849
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Figures in parentheses give standard errors, corrected for within-neighborhood dependencies.
All models use 25% most deprived neighborhoods as neighborhood variable and are for all individuals in the sample (low
and high educated together).
Table 4: Marginal effects from bivariate probit models with different instruments
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